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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case puts at issue again an ordinance of the City 
of Pittsburgh that prohibits certain speech within fifteen feet 
of health care facilities.  Plaintiffs Nikki Bruni, Julie 
Cosentino, Cynthia Rinaldi, Kathleen Laslow, and Patrick 
Malley engage in what they call “sidewalk counseling” on the 
public sidewalk outside of a Pittsburgh Planned Parenthood 
facility in an effort, through close conversation, to persuade 
women to forego abortion services.  The Plaintiffs filed suit in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, claiming that the Pittsburgh ordinance limiting 
their ability to approach people near the Planned Parenthood 
entrance violates their First and Fourteenth Amendments 
rights.  We previously upheld the City’s so-called “buffer 
zone” ordinance against the same kind of challenge in Brown 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2009).  Despite 
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that, the Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) – 
which struck down a similar Massachusetts state law – has 
sufficiently altered the constitutional analysis to compel a 
different result than we reached in Brown.  The District Court 
disagreed, hewing to our analysis in Brown and thus largely 
dismissing the Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the 
Ordinance.1 
 
 We will vacate in part and affirm in part.  Considered 
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the First 
Amendment claims are sufficient to go forward at this stage 
of the litigation.  The speech at issue is core political speech 
entitled to the maximum protection afforded by the First 
Amendment, and the City cannot burden it without first 
trying, or at least demonstrating that it has seriously 
considered, substantially less restrictive alternatives that 
would achieve the City’s legitimate, substantial, and content-
neutral interests.  McCullen teaches that the constitutionality 
of buffer zone laws turns on the factual circumstances giving 
rise to the law in each individual case – the same type of 
buffer zone may be upheld on one record where it might be 
struck down on another.  Hence, dismissal of claims 
challenging ordinances like the one at issue here will rarely, if 
ever, be appropriate at the pleading stage.  Instead, factual 
development will likely be indispensable to the assessment of 
whether an ordinance is constitutionally permissible.  We 
express no view on the ultimate merits of the Plaintiffs’ 
claims in this case, but, following the guidance of McCullen, 
                                              
 1 As more fully noted herein, see infra n.5, some of the 
Plaintiffs’ claims were permitted to stand but the Plaintiffs 
have since voluntarily dismissed them. 
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we will vacate the dismissal of the First Amendment claims 
so that they may be considered after appropriate development 
of a factual record.  Because the First Amendment claims 
cover all of the Plaintiffs’ contentions, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment claim is simply a recasting of free expression 
arguments, we will affirm the dismissal of that claim. 
 
I. BACKGROUND2 
 
 A. The Ordinance 
 
 On December 13, 2005, Pittsburgh’s City Council 
adopted Ordinance No. 49, which added Chapter 623 to the 
Pittsburgh Code of Ordinances.  That Chapter, titled “Public 
Safety at Health Care Facilities,” went into effect later in the 
month.   
 
 The part of the Ordinance that is now in dispute is 
§ 623.04, which establishes a “Fifteen-Foot Buffer Zone.”  It 
states that: 
 
[n]o person or persons shall knowingly 
congregate, patrol, picket or demonstrate in a 
zone extending fifteen (15) feet from any 
entrance to the hospital and or health care 
                                              
 2 Because the District Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint in response to the City’s motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in setting out the 
factual background here, we accept as true all facts alleged in 
the Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the Plaintiffs.  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
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facility.  This section shall not apply to police 
and public safety officers, fire and rescue 
personnel, or other emergency workers in the 
course of their official business, or to authorized 
security personnel employees or agents of the 
hospital, medical office or clinic engaged in 
assisting patients and other persons to enter or 
exit the hospital, medical office, or clinic. 
 
Pittsburgh Pa., Code § 623.04.  Although the term “health 
care facility” is not defined in the Chapter, a “[m]edical 
office/clinic” is defined as “an establishment providing 
therapeutic, preventative, corrective, healing and health-
building treatment services on an out-patient basis by 
physicians, dentists and other practitioners.”  Id. § 623.02. 
 
 In adopting the buffer zone Ordinance, the City 
Council also ratified a preamble, titled “Intent of Council,” 
that described the goals the City sought to accomplish: 
 
The City Council recognizes that access to 
Health Care Facilities for the purpose of 
obtaining medical counseling and treatment is 
important for residents and visitors to the City. 
The exercise of a person’s right to protest or 
counsel against certain medical procedures is a 
First Amendment activity that must be balanced 
against another person’s right to obtain medical 
counseling and treatment in an unobstructed 
manner; and 
 
The City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police has 
been consistently called upon in at least two (2) 
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locations within the City to mediate the disputes 
between those seeking medical counseling and 
treatment and those who would counsel against 
their actions so as to (i) avoid violent 
confrontations which would lead to criminal 
charges and (ii) enforce existing City 
Ordinances which regulate use of public 
sidewalks and other conduct; 
 
Such services require a dedicated and indefinite 
appropriation of policing services, which is 
being provided to the neglect of the law 
enforcement needs of the Zones in which these 
facilities exist. 
 
The City seeks a more efficient and wider 
deployment of its services which will help also 
reduce the risk of violence and provide 
unobstructed access to health care facilities by 
setting clear guidelines for activity in the 
immediate vicinity of the entrances to health 
care facilities; 
 
The Council finds that the limited buffer and 
bubble zones outside of health care facilities 
established by this chapter will ensure that 
patients have unimpeded access to medical 
services while ensuring that the First 
Amendment rights of demonstrators to 
communicate their message to their intended 
audience is not impaired. 
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Id. § 623.01.  Violations of the Ordinance are met with 
graduated penalties, ranging from a $50 fine for a first offense 
to a thirty-day maximum (and three-day minimum) jail 
sentence for a fourth violation within five years.  Id. § 623.05.  
As originally passed, the Ordinance also included an eight-
foot “floating bubble zone,” which established a 100-foot area 
around clinics in which people could not be approached 
without their consent within eight feet “for the purpose of 
passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or 
engaging in oral protest, education or counseling.”  Id. 
§ 623.03. 
 
 The Ordinance was challenged in court shortly after its 
passage.  In Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, we held that, 
although the fifteen-foot fixed buffer zone and the eight-foot 
floating bubble zone were each on their own constitutionally 
permissible, the combination of the two imposed a facially-
unconstitutional burden on free speech.  586 F.3d at 276, 281.  
On remand, the District Court issued an order permanently 
enjoining enforcement of the eight-foot floating bubble zone.  
Importantly for present purposes, the order also required that 
the fifteen-foot buffer zone be construed to prohibit “any 
person” from “picket[ing] or demonstrat[ing]” within the 
fixed buffer zone.3  (App. at 150a.)  The Plaintiffs challenge 
the constitutionality of the law as modified by the permanent 
injunction.   
                                              
 3 The order also required the City to provide training to 
the Pittsburgh City Police concerning proper enforcement of 
the Ordinance and to mark clearly the boundaries of any fixed 
buffer zone. 
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 B. Application of the Ordinance 
 
 Although the Ordinance applies, on its face, at all 
hospitals and health care facilities in Pittsburgh, the City has 
demarcated only two actual buffer zones, both outside the 
entrances of facilities that provide abortion services.  The 
allegations in the Complaint relate primarily to the Plaintiffs’ 
experiences at one of those two locations – the Planned 
Parenthood facility located at 933 Liberty Avenue.  At the 
front of that facility, a painted yellow semi-circle marks the 
buffer zone boundary within which the Ordinance bans 
demonstrating or picketing.   
 
 According to their Complaint, the Plaintiffs “regularly 
engage in peaceful prayer, leafleting, sidewalk counseling, 
pro-life advocacy, and other peaceful expressive activities” 
outside of that Planned Parenthood location.  (App. at 51a.)  
In their sidewalk counseling, they “seek to have quiet 
conversations and offer assistance and information to 
abortion-minded women by providing them pamphlets 
describing local pregnancy resources, praying, and … 
peacefully express[ing] this message of caring support to 
those entering and exiting the clinic.”  (App. at 58a.)  The 
City reads the Ordinance to prohibit sidewalk counseling as a 
form of “demonstrating” and has enforced the ban against 
those who, like the Plaintiffs, would engage in counseling 
within the buffer zone.  The prohibition “make[s] it more 
difficult [for the] Plaintiffs to engage in sidewalk counseling, 
prayer, advocacy, and other expressive activities.”  (App. at 
60a.)  Because close, personal interaction is “essential to [the 
Plaintiffs’] message,” as they wish to be viewed as 
counselors, “rather than to merely express [their] opposition 
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to abortion or to be seen as protesting” (App. at 60a-61a), the 
Ordinance frustrates effective communication of their 
message.  The prohibition also interferes with the Plaintiffs’ 
activities because they “are often unable to distinguish 
patients from passer[s]by at the distance that the zones require 
[the] Plaintiffs to remain.”  (App. at 61a.)4 
 
 C. Procedural History 
 
 Less than two years ago, the Supreme Court decided 
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014), which struck 
down a Massachusetts fixed buffer zone statute as 
insufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the significant 
government interests asserted for it.  Soon thereafter, the 
Plaintiffs in this suit filed their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against the City of Pittsburgh, the Pittsburgh City Council, 
and the Mayor of Pittsburgh.  The Plaintiffs brought facial 
challenges against the Ordinance under the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech and Free Press Clauses, and 
                                              
 4 In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs also describe 
specific episodes that have occurred outside of the Liberty 
Avenue Planned Parenthood, episodes in which their 
counseling was interrupted.  For example, Plaintiff Cosentino 
stated that on one occasion a clinic escort “yelled loudly” at 
her while she was speaking with a young woman outside of 
the buffer zone, and multiple clinic employees then 
“surrounded the young woman” and led her into the clinic.  
(App. at 58a-59a.)  On another occasion, Plaintiff Rinaldi 
stated that a security guard stifled her speech outside of the 
buffer zone while she was discussing adoption options with a 
young woman.   
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another facial challenge under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.5  They also sought a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the City from enforcing the Ordinance 
against them.  The City responded with a motion pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the 
Complaint for failure to state a claim.   
 
 The District Court held a hearing on the motion for a 
preliminary injunction, at which the Court heard testimony 
from Plaintiff Bruni and Ms. Kimberlee Evert, the CEO and 
President of Planned Parenthood of Western Pennsylvania.  
The parties also submitted documentary evidence.  The City 
submitted declarations from Evert and Ms. Paula Harris, a 
“clinic escort” at the facility.6  The Plaintiffs submitted two 
affidavits, one from Plaintiff Laslow and the other from their 
counsel, Matthew Bowman.   
 
 The District Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss 
the Plaintiffs’ facial challenges to the Ordinance under the 
                                              
 5 The Plaintiffs’ Complaint also included as-applied 
challenges, an Equal Protection claim, and a selective 
enforcement claim against the Mayor of Pittsburgh, all of 
which the District Court did not dismiss.  After the District 
Court’s ruling, the Plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss 
those remaining claims, which are, consequently, not before 
us on appeal.   
 
 6 “A clinic escort is a volunteer who is trained to walk 
alongside patients and their companions who want to be 
accompanied as they approach or leave a health care facility.”  
(App. at 152a.) 
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First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.7  In addition, the Court denied the 
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. 
 
 The Plaintiffs then filed this timely appeal.  They seek 
review only of the dismissal of their First Amendment and 
Due Process claims against the City and not the denial of their 
preliminary injunction motion.   
                                              
 7 The Court also dismissed all claims against the City 
Council, which the Plaintiffs do not challenge in this appeal. 
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II. DISCUSSION8 
 
 A. Standard of Review 
 
  “[O]ur standard of review of a district court’s 
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is 
plenary.”  Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 
181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).  In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, courts must “accept all factual allegations as true, 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to 
relief.”  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  While 
“accept[ing] all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true,” 
the district court “may disregard any legal conclusions.”  Id. 
at 210-11. 
 
 In considering a motion to dismiss, the district court is 
also bound not to “go beyond the facts alleged in the 
Complaint and the documents on which the claims made 
therein [are] based.”  In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997).  The court may, 
however, rely upon “exhibits attached to the complaint and 
matters of public record.”  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. 
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 
1993).  If other “matters outside the pleadings are presented 
                                              
 
 8 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated 
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(d).  When that occurs, “[a]ll parties must be given a 
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is 
pertinent to the motion.”  Id.9  “The element that triggers the 
conversion [from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion into a 
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment] is a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the pleader’s claim supported by extra-pleading 
material.”  5C Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. 
Civ. § 1366 (3d ed.).  “The reason that a court must convert a 
motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion if it 
considers extraneous evidence submitted by the defense is to 
afford the plaintiff an opportunity to respond.”  Pension 
Benefit. Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196. 
 
 The District Court here based its decision to dismiss 
not only upon the allegations in the Complaint but also, it 
appears, upon testimony given at the hearing and the 
supplemental declarations filed by Harris, Evert, Laslow, and 
Bowman.  Indeed, in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ facial 
challenges to the Ordinance, the Court seems to have based 
its decision entirely on its analysis of the merits of the 
                                              
9 Although notice need not be express, we have 
recommended that district courts provide express notice 
because it “is easy to give and removes ambiguities.”  In re 
Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 288 
n.11 (3d Cir. 1999).  The City’s motion to dismiss was styled 
only as a motion to dismiss and made no reference to possible 
conversion into a summary judgment motion.  A review of 
the transcript of the motions hearing verifies that neither the 
Court nor the parties ever mentioned such a conversion. 
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preliminary injunction motion.10  Although it relied upon 
extra-pleading materials, the Court never discussed treating 
the motion as one for summary judgment. 
 
 Thus before reaching the merits, we face a difficulty.  
“We have previously stated that the label a district court 
places on its disposition is not binding on an appellate court.”  
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339-40 (3d Cir. 1989).  Because 
the District Court relied, at least in part, on materials 
presented outside of the pleadings, “we are constrained … to 
treat the district court’s disposition of the matter pursuant to 
Rule 56, and not Rule 12(b)(6).”  Ford Motor Co. v. Summit 
Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 1991).  But the 
Plaintiffs were not given the “reasonable opportunity” to 
present additional evidence as was their right under Rule 
12(d).  That was error.  “We have held that it is reversible 
error for a district court to convert a motion under Rule 
12(b)(6) … into a motion for summary judgment unless the 
court provides notice of its intention to convert the motion 
and allows an opportunity to submit materials admissible in a 
summary judgment proceeding or allows a hearing.”11  Rose, 
871 F.2d at 342. 
                                              
 10 Specifically, the District Court engaged in a careful 
analysis of the merits of the Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction 
motion, and then incorporated that analysis into a relatively 
brief discussion of the motion to dismiss by saying only, “See 
analysis supra.”  (App. at 35a.) 
 
 11 It is not enough that the Plaintiffs had an opportunity 
to submit evidence in connection with the preliminary 
injunction motion.  Even if the parties understood that the 
City’s motion to dismiss was being converted to a motion for 
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summary judgment, the standards governing a motion for a 
preliminary injunction and a motion for summary judgment 
are entirely different, and it cannot be assumed that a 
response to one was meant as a response to the other.  As the 
Plaintiffs point out, evidence was offered only to support their 
request for a preliminary injunction, and should not have been 
treated as their entire defense to an improperly-converted 
summary judgment motion “without giving [Plaintiffs] an 
opportunity to show … that the City’s evidence fails” to 
withstand proper scrutiny.  (Reply Br. at 22.)  With no 
reflection of notice or an agreement to treat the record 
developed for the preliminary injunction as being a full record 
for summary judgment, conversion of the motion was not 
justified.  Moreover, the “undeveloped factual record” (App. 
at 22a) that the District Court determined was insufficient to 
support a preliminary injunction was no better developed for 
purposes of summary judgment. 
 Even had the District Court restricted its review to the 
pleadings, it erred by directly equating the standard for 
evaluating a preliminary injunction with the standard 
applicable to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  On a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, a plaintiff bears the burden to show, among other 
things, “that he is likely to succeed on the merits … .”  
Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 
210 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).  To withstand a motion 
to dismiss, on the other hand, a plaintiff need only 
demonstrate that he “may be entitled to relief under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint,” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 
F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010), and “[t]he defendant bears the 
burden of showing that no claim has been presented,” Hedges 
v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005).  Given the 
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 Nevertheless, the failure to follow the dictates of Rule 
12(d) is subject to a harmless error analysis and may be 
excused if no prejudice to the plaintiffs would result.  Ford 
Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 284-85.  “Thus, even where the 
opportunity to submit pertinent material is not given, a grant 
of summary judgment for a defendant may be affirmed where 
there is no state of facts on which plaintiff could conceivably 
recover.”  Id. at 285 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
our harmless error analysis, the “standard of review … is 
plenary: we may affirm if, and only if, on the basis of the 
complaints filed by these plaintiffs there was no set of facts 
which could be proven to establish defendants’ liability.”  
Rose, 871 F.2d at 342.  We therefore review the Complaint 
against the motion to dismiss standard.  Neither the 
documentary nor the testimonial evidence submitted below 
will be considered in assessing the merits of the City’s motion 
to dismiss.12 
                                                                                                     
significant differences between those two standards, a 
plaintiff’s failure to meet his burden on a motion for a 
preliminary injunction does not mean ipso facto that the 
complaint fails to state a claim. 
 
 12 The amicus brief submitted by Planned Parenthood 
of Western Pennsylvania and Pittsburgh Pro-Choice Escorts 
also includes a considerable amount of evidence that purports 
to be testimony taken by the Pittsburgh City Council during 
the original 2005 hearing on whether to adopt the Ordinance.  
The testimony may be significant, as it speaks to the alleged 
need for the buffer zones and the alternatives employed by 
the City prior to its enactment.  But we cannot consider it in 
our review, as the testimony would, again, effectively convert 
the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.  
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 B. Merits Analysis 
 
 On appeal, the Plaintiffs’ mount facial challenges to 
the Ordinance under both the Free Speech and Free Press 
Clauses of the First Amendment as proscribing protected 
speech, and under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment due to the Ordinance’s allegedly vesting 
“unbridled discretion” in City officials.  (Opening Br. at 16.)  
A facial challenge “seeks to vindicate not only [a plaintiff’s] 
own rights, but those of others who may also be adversely 
impacted by the statute in question.”  CMR D.N. Corp. v. City 
of Phila., 703 F.3d 612, 623 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting City of 
Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999)).  A successful 
as-applied challenge bars a law’s enforcement against a 
particular plaintiff, whereas a successful facial challenge 
results in “complete invalidation of a law.”  CMR D.N. Corp., 
703 F.3d at 624.  The distinction between facial and as-
applied constitutional challenges, then, is of critical 
importance in determining the remedy to be provided. 
 
 In evaluating a facial challenge we must look beyond 
the application of an ordinance in the specific case before us.  
To ultimately succeed on the merits, a plaintiff theoretically 
has “to establish that no set of circumstances exists under 
which [the ordinance] would be valid, or that the [ordinance] 
lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.”  United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  In the First Amendment context, the 
Supreme Court has softened that daunting standard 
                                                                                                     
Moreover, it does not appear to have been before the District 
Court and is not part of the record in this case. 
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somewhat, saying that a law may also be invalidated on its 
face “if a substantial number of its applications are 
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.”  Id. at 473 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
 Despite those pronouncements, the Supreme Court has 
also recognized that “the distinction between facial and as-
applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some 
automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings 
and disposition in every case involving a constitutional 
challenge.”  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 331 
(2010); see also John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194 
(2010) (“The label is not what matters.”).  As already stated, 
the distinction goes to the breadth of the remedy provided, but 
“not what must be pleaded in a complaint.”  Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 331.  The Court has often considered facial 
challenges simply by applying the relevant constitutional test 
to the challenged statute, without trying to dream up whether 
or not there exists some hypothetical situation in which 
application of the statute might be valid.  Doe v. City of 
Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(collecting cases); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (warning courts 
deciding facial challenges not to “speculate about 
‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases”); Janklow v. Planned 
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., respecting denial of cert.) (noting that the “no set 
of circumstances” formulation “has been properly ignored in 
subsequent cases,” and collecting cases).  “[W]here a statute 
fails the relevant constitutional test (such as strict scrutiny … 
or reasonableness review), it can no longer be constitutionally 
applied to anyone – and thus there is ‘no set of circumstances’ 
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in which the statute would be valid.  The relevant 
constitutional test, however, remains the proper inquiry.”  
Doe, 667 F.3d at 1127.  We therefore consider the Plaintiffs’ 
facial challenge to the City’s buffer zone Ordinance by resort 
to the analytical framework governing free speech claims. 
 
  1. Free Speech Claim 
 
 That framework typically begins with an assessment of 
whether the challenged law restricts speech based upon its 
content.  “[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means 
that government has no power to restrict expression because 
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” 
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 
573 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Such 
“[c]ontent-based prohibitions … have the constant potential 
to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free 
people.”  Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 
U.S. 656, 660 (2004).  To guard against that threat, the First 
Amendment requires that, if a statute draws a content-based 
distinction – thereby favoring some ideas over others – we 
apply strict scrutiny to the challenged law.  Under that 
heightened scrutiny, the law is “presumptively 
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government 
proves that [it is] narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests.”  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 
(2015).  A content-based restriction, unlike a neutral law, 
must also be “the least restrictive or least intrusive means of 
serving the government’s interests.”  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 
2535 (internal quotation marks omitted).  As such, “[i]t is rare 
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will 
ever be permissible.”  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. 
Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  If, 
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on the other hand, the law is content-neutral, we apply 
intermediate scrutiny and ask whether it is “narrowly tailored 
to serve a significant governmental interest.”  Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994). 
 
   a. Assuming Content Neutrality 
 
 The Plaintiffs contend that the Ordinance constitutes a 
content-based restriction on speech and is thus subject to 
strict scrutiny.  Although we held in Brown that Pittsburgh’s 
buffer-zone Ordinance was content-neutral, see Brown, 586 
F.3d at 275, the Plaintiffs argue that that conclusion is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s post-Brown decision in 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), which they 
say changed how courts draw the line between content-
neutral and content-based restrictions.  In Reed, the Supreme 
Court held that a town code governing the manner of display 
of outdoor signs that distinguished between ideological, 
political, and directional signs was an impermissible content-
based restriction on speech.  In reaching that conclusion, the 
Court defined content-based laws as “those that target speech 
based on its communicative content … .”  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 
2226.  Of relevance here, the Court identified a “subtle” way 
in which statutes can, on their face, discriminate based upon 
content, namely by “defining regulated speech by its function 
or purpose.”  Id. at 2227.  The Plaintiffs in the present case 
contend that, in defining proscribed expression as that which 
involves “demonstrating” or “picketing,” Pittsburgh’s 
Ordinance runs afoul of Reed by limiting speech based upon 
its intended purpose. 
 
 Although the Plaintiffs make a compelling argument 
that Reed has altered the applicable analysis of content 
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neutrality, we need not consider the impact of Reed because 
the Complaint presents a viable free speech challenge to the 
buffer-zone Ordinance under the lower standard of scrutiny to 
which a content-neutral restriction on speech is subject.  We 
can assume the Ordinance is content-neutral, even though the 
City contends we may not do so – which is ironic since the 
City is the party benefitting from the assumption.  The City 
relies on McCullen, pointing out that the Supreme Court, in 
striking down the Massachusetts buffer zone law, addressed 
content-neutrality to determine the applicable level of 
scrutiny.  134 S. Ct. at 2530.  The Court concluded that the 
Massachusetts law, which prohibited “knowingly stand[ing]” 
within thirty-five feet of the entrance of facilities where 
abortions are performed, id. at 2525, was a content-neutral 
restriction on free expression, id. at 2534.  Although the Court 
recognized that it was empowered to simply assume, without 
deciding, that the law was subject to a less stringent level of 
scrutiny – as it ultimately struck down the statute under that 
lesser scrutiny anyway – it went ahead and engaged in the 
content-neutrality analysis at the first step, the “ordinary order 
of operations,” because doing so would not have placed the 
Court at risk of “overruling a precedent.”13  Id. at 2530. 
 
                                              
 13 To clarify the point, the Supreme Court contrasted 
an earlier case, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445-
46 (2014).  In McCutcheon, the Court assumed a lower level 
of First Amendment scrutiny in striking down a challenged 
statute because deciding to apply heightened scrutiny would 
have needlessly required the Court to revisit its past decisions 
on the subject. 
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 Here, by contrast, the conclusion that the Ordinance is 
a content-based restriction on speech would require us to 
overrule our holding in Brown that the Ordinance imposes 
only a content-neutral ban.  We need not take that step, 
though, as we would reverse the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ 
free speech claim even under the lesser scrutiny reserved for 
content-neutral restrictions on speech.  Accordingly, we will 
assume, as was held in Brown, that the Ordinance is content 
neutral and apply the intermediate level of scrutiny due such 
restrictions.14 
 
   b. Brown and its Antecedents 
 
 To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, a content-neutral 
limitation on speech “must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest.’”  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 
2534 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 
796 (1989)).  “[B]y demanding a close fit between ends and 
means, the tailoring requirement prevents the government 
from too readily sacrificing speech for efficiency.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).  Before 
McCullen, the Supreme Court had decided three cases 
involving similar buffer zones at medical facilities.  In the 
first two of those cases – Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 
Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) and Schenck v. Pro-Choice 
Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) – the 
                                              
 14 Although we do not address the issue, should it arise 
and need to be addressed on remand, the District Court will 
need to examine Reed and its effect on the content-neutrality 
analysis to decide whether that case compels a break from 
Brown’s holding that the Ordinance is a content-neutral 
restriction on speech. 
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Court confronted the issue in the context of injunctions 
prohibiting specific individuals from interfering with public 
access to clinics.  It viewed both restrictions, a thirty-six foot 
buffer zone in Madsen and a fifteen foot zone in Schenck, as 
sufficiently narrowly tailored and thus upheld them under 
intermediate scrutiny. 
 
In Madsen, the Court noted that the thirty-six foot 
buffer zone at issue in that case was created by way of 
injunctive relief only after a first injunction (which enjoined 
the specified protesters from blocking or interfering with 
public access to the clinic) proved insufficient to serve the 
government’s stated interests.  Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769-70.  
The Court also emphasized that “the state court found that 
[those protesters] repeatedly had interfered with the free 
access of patients and staff” to the clinic in question before 
issuing the injunction, leaving the state court with “few other 
options to protect access” to the clinic.  Id. at 769. 
 
Similarly, in Schenck, the Court upheld the fixed 
buffer zone because “the record show[ed] that protesters 
purposefully or effectively blocked or hindered people from 
entering and exiting the clinic doorways, from driving up to 
and away from clinic entrances, and from driving in and out 
of clinic parking lots.”  519 U.S. at 380.  The Schenck Court 
also struck down a floating bubble zone as insufficiently 
tailored to the government’s interests.  Id. at 377-80.  The 
restriction was overbroad chiefly because of the type of 
speech it restricted (leafleting and other comments on matters 
of public concern) and the nature of the location (a public 
sidewalk).  Id. at 377.  The Court emphasized the potential for 
uncertainty that a floating bubble zone creates – “[w]ith clinic 
escorts leaving the clinic to pick up incoming patients and 
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entering the clinic to drop them off, it would be quite difficult 
for a protester who wishes to engage in peaceful expressive 
activities to know how to remain in compliance with the 
injunction” – and the resultant “substantial risk that much 
more speech will be burdened than the injunction by its terms 
prohibits.”  Id. at 378.  In contrast with the fixed buffer zone 
which was upheld, the floating zone “[could] not be sustained 
on th[e] record” before the Court.  Id. at 377. 
 
 In the third buffer zone case, Hill v. Colorado, the 
Supreme Court held, in spite of its earlier ruling in Schenck, 
that an eight-foot floating bubble zone satisfied intermediate 
scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement.  530 U.S. 703, 725 
(2000).  The Hill Court explained the differences between the 
bubble zones in the two cases.  See id. at 726-27.  Schenck 
involved a fifteen-foot bubble zone, whereas Hill’s was eight 
feet, which, the Court concluded, allowed speech “at a normal 
conversational distance.”  Id. at 726-27 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  By the Court’s estimation, the eight-foot 
zone would have no “adverse impact” on one’s ability to read 
a sign, would permit oral communication “at a normal 
conversational distance,” and would not “prevent a leafletter 
from simply standing near the path of oncoming pedestrians 
and proffering his or her material … .”  Id. at 726-27 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “Signs, pictures, and voice itself 
can cross an 8-foot gap with ease.”  Id. at 729.  Additionally, 
the Hill statute allowed the speaker to remain in one place 
while other people passed within eight feet.  Id. at 727.  
Finally, the Hill statute also required that any violation be 
“knowing,” so that an inadvertent breach of the zone would 
not be unlawful.  Id. 
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 Although we previously concluded in Brown that the 
City’s Ordinance was sufficiently narrowly tailored, we did 
so out of deference to the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Madsen and Schenck.  See Brown, 586 F.3d at 276.  But each 
of those cases, as well as Hill, implies that the application of 
intermediate scrutiny’s narrow tailoring analysis must depend 
on the particular facts at issue.  That implication was made 
explicit in McCullen. 
 
   c. McCullen’s Clarification of the  
    Law 
 
 In McCullen, the Supreme Court struck down the 
Massachusetts law’s thirty-five foot buffer zone as 
insufficiently narrowly tailored under intermediate scrutiny.  
It concluded that the zone “burden[s] substantially more 
speech than necessary to achieve the Commonwealth’s 
asserted interests.”  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537.  The Court 
started its analysis by recognizing the nature of the burden the 
buffer zone imposed upon the petitioners’ speech.  Like the 
Plaintiffs here, the petitioners in McCullen engaged in 
sidewalk counseling in an effort to persuade women entering 
abortion facilities to consider alternatives.  Id. at 2527.  Given 
that mode of expression, the Court emphasized the 
petitioners’ need to engage in “personal, caring, consensual 
conversations” rather than “chanting slogans and displaying 
signs” as a form of protest against abortion.  Id. at 2536.  It 
was thus insufficient that the counselors could be seen and 
heard at a distance by the women in the buffer zone, because 
“[i]f all that the women can see and hear are vociferous 
opponents of abortion, then the buffer zones have effectively 
stifled petitioners’ message.”  Id. at 2537. 
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 The limitation on their speech also occurred, as it does 
here, in the quintessential public forum of public streets and 
sidewalks, areas that occupy “a special position in terms of 
First Amendment protection … .”  Id. at 2529 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The restriction thus struck at the 
heart of speech protected by the First Amendment.  See id. at 
2536 (“[W]hile the First Amendment does not guarantee a 
speaker the right to any particular form of expression, some 
forms – such as normal conversation and leafletting on a 
public sidewalk – have historically been more closely 
associated with the transmission of ideas than others.”).  
“When the government makes it more difficult to engage in 
these modes of communication, it imposes an especially 
significant First Amendment burden.”  Id. 
 
 Balanced against that significant burden on speech was 
the means chosen to effectuate the government’s purpose.  
McCullen emphasized the unusual nature of such buffer zone 
laws – at the time McCullen was decided, only six (including 
Pittsburgh’s) existed across the entire United States, id. at 
2537 n.6 – which “raise[d] concern that the Commonwealth 
ha[d] too readily forgone options that could serve its interests 
just as well … .”  Id. at 2537.  In the Supreme Court’s view, 
Massachusetts had a number of less speech-restrictive 
alternatives available to address its goals: it could utilize 
“existing local ordinances” banning obstruction of public 
ways, id. at 2538; “generic criminal statutes forbidding 
assault, breach of the peace, trespass, vandalism, and the 
like,” id.; and “targeted injunctions” like those in Madsen and 
Schenck, id.  The Court also emphasized that the congestion 
problem the Commonwealth cited arose mainly at one Boston 
clinic, which did not justify “creating 35-foot buffer zones at 
every clinic across the Commonwealth.”  Id. at 2539. 
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 The Court further rejected the Commonwealth’s 
contention that it “ha[d] tried other approaches, but they do 
not work.”  Id.  Although the Commonwealth claimed it had 
revised the statute because an earlier, less restrictive, version 
was too difficult to enforce, the Court noted that 
Massachusetts could not document a single prosecution 
brought under its previous statutes “within at least the last 17 
years” and “the last injunctions … date[d] to the 1990s.”  Id.  
The Commonwealth had thus not met its narrow-tailoring 
burden because it “ha[d] not shown that it seriously undertook 
to address the problem with less intrusive tools readily 
available to it.  Nor ha[d] it shown that it considered different 
methods that other jurisdictions have found effective.”  Id.  In 
light of the “vital First Amendment interests at stake, it [was] 
not enough for Massachusetts simply to say that other 
approaches have not worked.”  Id. at 2540.  It had to either 
back up that assertion with evidence of past efforts, and the 
failures of those efforts, to remedy the problems that existed 
outside of the Commonwealth’s abortion clinics, or otherwise 
demonstrate its serious consideration of, and reasonable 
decision to forego, alternative measures that would burden 
substantially less speech.  The Court recognized that a buffer 
zone would likely make the Commonwealth’s job easier, but 
“the prime objective of the First Amendment is not 
efficiency.”  Id.  “To meet the requirement of narrow 
tailoring, the government must demonstrate that alternative 
measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to 
achieve the government’s interests, not simply that the chosen 
route is easier.”  Id.  In the absence of that kind of fact-
specific showing, the Supreme Court struck down the buffer 
zone law as insufficiently narrowly tailored under 
intermediate scrutiny. 
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   d. Application of Intermediate  
    Scrutiny to Pittsburgh’s   
    Ordinance 
 
 As to the government interests at stake in a case like 
this, all four of the Supreme Court’s buffer zone precedents – 
Madsen, Schenck, Hill, and McCullen – accepted that the 
laws at issue furthered significant government interests.  
Schenck identified those interests as: “protecting a woman’s 
freedom to seek pregnancy-related services, ensuring public 
safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets 
and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting the 
medical privacy of patients … .”  519 U.S. at 372.  Here, the 
statement of intent of the Pittsburgh City Council asserts the 
same kinds of justifications: ensuring patients have 
“unimpeded access to medical services,” eliminating the 
“neglect” of other law enforcement needs, and letting the City 
provide “a more efficient and wider deployment of its 
services.”  Pittsburgh Pa., Code § 623.01.  Consistent with 
Schenck, we held in Brown that the Ordinance served 
significant governmental interests.  586 F.3d at 276.  Nothing 
since Brown has altered that conclusion.  Indeed, McCullen 
noted that such goals reflect “undeniably significant 
interests,” 134 S. Ct. at 2541, and the Plaintiffs in the present 
case do not dispute the significance of the City’s interests.   
 
 Nevertheless, the Ordinance must still be narrowly 
tailored to serve those interests.  The District Court, applying 
intermediate scrutiny (without the benefit of Reed), 
essentially concluded that its analysis was controlled by our 
narrow-tailoring holding in Brown.  The Court reasoned that 
McCullen had not “explicitly overrule[d] Hill or articulate[d] 
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a deviation from the standard outlined in that case.”  (App. at 
26a.)  In the absence of a clear break from precedent, the 
District Court concluded that it was bound by our prior 
analysis.  In the District Court’s view, McCullen also did not 
represent a binding application of the intermediate scrutiny 
standard because that case involved a thirty-five foot buffer 
zone and thus imposed a greater “degree of burden” on 
speech than the fifteen-foot zone in Pittsburgh.  (App. at 31a.) 
 
 Of course, in a mathematical sense the degree of 
infringement on the Plaintiffs’ speech here is less than that 
imposed on the petitioners in McCullen, fifteen feet being less 
than thirty-five.  But more than math is involved, and, even at 
fifteen feet, Pittsburgh’s buffer zone raises serious questions 
under the First Amendment.  None of the four prior cases 
assessing buffer zones turned solely on the size of the zones.  
What matters is the burden on speech that such zones impose, 
of which size is one but only one feature.  Indeed, smaller 
buffer zones are not always better: McCullen struck down a 
thirty-five foot zone even though Madsen had previously 
upheld a slightly larger zone.  McCullen never referenced the 
size of the approved zone in Madsen or that the 
Massachusetts zones were actually smaller.  Those cases 
turned on their distinct factual records, not a simple 
difference in real estate.  McCullen emphasized the “serious 
burdens” that the law imposed on speech by “compromis[ing] 
petitioners’ ability to initiate the close, personal conversations 
that they view as essential to ‘sidewalk counseling.’”  134 S. 
Ct. at 2535.  Any difference between the burden on speech in 
McCullen and that here is a matter of degree rather than 
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kind.15  Thus, the size of the zone at issue here is not 
dispositive, and we must look more broadly at the allegations 
of the Complaint. 
 
 According to those allegations, Pittsburgh’s buffer 
zone Ordinance “prohibits Plaintiffs and others from 
                                              
 15 We agree with the observation of our concurring 
colleague that the degree of burden on speech here is less than 
that in McCullen, because the zones in Massachusetts were 
larger, applied state-wide, and limited any entry into the 
prohibited areas.  But the protracted discussion undertaken by 
the concurrence in an effort to contrast McCullen with this 
case is unnecessary, since the differences do not change the 
applicable analysis under intermediate scrutiny.  As far as we 
can tell, the concurrence does not contend that those 
differences somehow save the Ordinance at issue here from 
intermediate scrutiny or subject it to a lesser level of review.  
In fact, our colleague says that he “cannot conclude, on the 
basis of the allegations in the Complaint, that the Pittsburgh 
buffer zones operate so differently from the Massachusetts 
zones that Plaintiffs cannot advance past the pleading stage.”  
(Concurrence at 25.)  Because we agree with that statement, 
we see little point in contrasting the two laws in lengthy dicta.  
Any law that imposes a similar burden as that in McCullen – 
foreclosing speech about an important subject in a 
quintessential public forum “without seriously addressing the 
problem through alternatives that leave the forum open for its 
time-honored purposes,” 134 S. Ct. at 2541 – is subject to the 
same narrow tailoring analysis as the Supreme Court 
employed in that opinion.  The concurrence does not deny 
that Pittsburgh’s Ordinance is such a law.  We are simply 
following where McCullen has led. 
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effectively reaching their intended audience.”  (App. at 56a.)  
The Complaint further alleges that “[t]he zones created by the 
Ordinance make it more difficult [for the] Plaintiffs to engage 
in sidewalk counseling, prayer, advocacy, and other 
expressive activities,” (App. at 60a), and that the Ordinance 
“will cause conversations between the Plaintiffs and those 
entering or exiting the facilities to be far less frequent and far 
less successful.”  (App. at 60a.)  Taking those allegations as 
true, the burden on the Plaintiffs’ speech is akin to that 
imposed upon the petitioners in McCullen, and nothing in the 
Complaint suggests otherwise.16 
                                              
 
 16 The concurrence offers some suppositions about the 
possible ways the Ordinance might affect people, like 
Plaintiffs, engaging in sidewalk counseling.  For example, it 
notes that counselors will likely be able to distinguish patients 
from passersby because “[a] patient heading toward a clinic 
will almost certainly have manifested her intention to enter 
the clinic by the time she is 15 feet from its entrance” 
(Concurrence at 19), even though the photograph of the 
Planned Parenthood buffer zone provided by the City shows 
that it extends to the edge of the sidewalk and into the street, 
which would seemingly make it quite difficult for counselors 
to make any distinction between patients walking into the 
clinic and pedestrians walking by it.  Despite the guesswork, 
the concurrence concludes by emphasizing that, “it is not the 
Court’s role on a 12(b)(6) motion to supplant the well-
pleaded allegations with its own speculation, or to question 
the Plaintiffs’ characterization of their experiences.”  
(Concurrence at 23.)  That last observation is certainly 
correct, which is why we have opted not to speculate or 
question the allegations of the Complaint. 
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 Because of the significant burden on speech that the 
Ordinance allegedly imposes, the City has the same 
obligation to use less restrictive alternatives to its buffer zone 
as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had with respect to 
the buffer zone at issue in McCullen.  As stated, that 
obligation requires that the government “demonstrate that 
alternative measures that burden substantially less speech 
would fail to achieve the government’s interests.”  McCullen, 
134 S. Ct. at 2540.  The statement of intent of the Pittsburgh 
City Council – in which the Council stated that Pittsburgh’s 
police had “been consistently called upon in at least two 
locations within the City to mediate the disputes …. [causing] 
indefinite appropriation of policing services,” Pittsburgh Pa., 
Code § 623.01 – does not by itself satisfy the required 
constitutional scrutiny of the Ordinance.  Although “we must 
accord a measure of deference” to the government’s 
judgment, Hill, 530 U.S. at 727, as in McCullen, “it is not 
enough for [the City] simply to say that other approaches 
have not worked.”  134 S. Ct. at 2540.  We recognize that the 
City need not employ “the least restrictive or least intrusive 
means of serving its interests,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, but it 
must, in some meaningful way, “demonstrate that alternative 
measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to 
achieve the government’s interests,” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 
2540.  Because the City has available to it the same range of 
alternatives that McCullen identified – anti-obstruction 
ordinances, criminal enforcement, and targeted injunctions – 
it must justify its choice to adopt the Ordinance.  To do so, 
the City would have to show either that substantially less-
restrictive alternatives were tried and failed, or that the 
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alternatives were closely examined and ruled out for good 
reason.17 
                                              
 17 The concurrence repeatedly tries to downplay the 
significance of McCullen –  variously referring to the opinion 
as “incremental,” “modest,” and “unexceptional” 
(Concurrence at 4-5) – and devotes much of its energy to 
narrowing that case only to its facts.  It does so, presumably, 
in service of a desire to avoid the import of the Supreme 
Court’s decision.  Consider our colleague’s reading of 
McCullen: “[u]nlike the majority, I do not believe that 
McCullen announces a general rule requiring the government 
to affirmatively prove that less-restrictive measures would fail 
to achieve its interests.”  (Concurrence at 1-2.)  Then try to 
reconcile that with the actual language of McCullen: “To 
meet the requirement of narrow tailoring, the government 
must demonstrate that alternative measures that burden 
substantially less speech would fail to achieve the 
government’s interests, not simply that the chosen route is 
easier.”  134 S. Ct. at 2540.  We are more ready than our 
colleague is to take the high Court at its word, and that is the 
heart of our disagreement with him.   
 Nevertheless, he asserts that our analysis “is contrary 
to McCullen and distorts First Amendment doctrine.”  
(Concurrence at 7.)  Far from it.  We are doing nothing more 
than applying McCullen according to its terms.  In the 
unanimous language of the Supreme Court, “it is not enough 
for [the government] simply to say that other approaches have 
not worked.”  Id.  Again, the burden is on the government to 
actually demonstrate that alternative measures would fail to 
meet the government’s legitimate ends.  We are simply 
holding the City to that standard, as was done in McCullen. 
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 By that statement, we do not suggest that the City must 
demonstrate that it has used the least-restrictive alternative, 
nor do we propose that the City demonstrate it has tried or 
considered every less burdensome alternative to its 
Ordinance.  See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 (concluding that “[t]he 
                                                                                                     
 The concurrence claims that we have neglected to 
answer “the central constitutional question: assuming that the 
proposed alternatives would burden less speech than a 15-foot 
buffer zone, would they burden substantially less speech?”  
(Concurrence at 14.)  But McCullen answered that question 
for us; it just did not provide the answer our concurring 
colleague might prefer.  In that opinion, the Supreme Court 
laid out some of the less-burdensome alternatives to a buffer 
zone law.  Because the burden on Plaintiffs’ speech here is 
akin to that present in McCullen, the City similarly “has 
available to it a variety of approaches that appear capable of 
serving its interests, without excluding individuals from areas 
historically open for speech and debate.”  134 S. Ct. at 2539.  
The existence of those substantially less burdensome 
alternatives obligates the City to try them or consider them.  
Again, that is not our requirement.  It is the Supreme Court’s: 
“the Commonwealth has not shown that it seriously 
undertook to address the problem with less intrusive tools 
readily available to it.  Nor has it shown that it considered 
different methods that other jurisdictions have found 
effective.”  Id.  Our analysis here is not nearly the novelty 
that the concurrence suggests.  This case calls for nothing 
more than a straightforward application of McCullen – the 
Ordinance imposes the same kind of burden on speech, the 
same less burdensome options are available, and the City has 
similarly failed to try or to consider those alternatives to 
justify its Ordinance. 
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Court of Appeals erred in sifting through all the available or 
imagined alternative means of regulating sound volume in 
order to determine whether the city’s solution was the least 
intrusive means of achieving the desired end” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  On the contrary, analysis under 
intermediate scrutiny affords some deference to a 
municipality’s judgment in adopting a content-neutral 
restriction on speech.18  But the municipality may not forego 
                                              
 18 Despite our repeated recognition of the broad 
principle of deference to legislative judgments and our 
explicit assurance that legislatures need not meticulously vet 
every less burdensome alternative, the concurrence 
nonetheless persists in suggesting that we are somehow 
saying the opposite, “eliminat[ing] much of the discretion” 
given to lawmakers and “requiring governments to adopt the 
least restrictive alternative.”  (Concurrence at 11-12.)  Both 
fears are unfounded.  We can only say what we have 
repeatedly said elsewhere in this opinion: we are imposing 
neither requirement.  All we can do to allay the concurrence’s 
concerns, we surmise, is to emphasize that we mean what we 
say. 
 The concurrence similarly claims that we are 
conducting an unprecedented “show us your work” review of 
the underlying legislative record, “something no court has 
ever required.”  (Concurrence at 9.)  Although we (yet again) 
acknowledge the need for deference, heightened scrutiny 
must mean something.  It is impossible to read McCullen any 
other way.  That case dug into the record, discussed the 
substantially less burdensome alternatives available, and 
assessed the Commonwealth’s failure to use those alternatives 
to address its significant interests.  And that was not a novel 
approach.  Past intermediate scrutiny cases engage in similar 
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a range of alternatives – which would burden substantially 
less expression than a blanket prohibition on Plaintiffs’ 
speech in a historically-public forum – without a meaningful 
record demonstrating that those options would fail to alleviate 
the problems meant to be addressed.  Properly crediting the 
allegations of the Complaint, Pittsburgh has not met that 
burden. 
 
 Of course, the City had no opportunity to properly 
produce such evidence at the motion-to-dismiss stage.  
Instead, we must accept as true at this stage of the case the 
                                                                                                     
review of the legislative record.  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 211 (1997) (assessing “must carry” 
provision by scrutinizing the legislative record, and ultimately 
asking “whether the legislative conclusion was reasonable 
and supported by substantial evidence in the record before 
Congress” (emphasis added)); City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (examining the 
legislative record supporting the City of Renton’s adoption of 
its ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters within 1,000 
feet of residential areas); see also United States v. Playboy 
Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000) (striking down 
content-based restriction on speech, under strict scrutiny, 
citing the “near barren legislative record relevant to th[at] 
provision”).  The government bears the burden to establish 
the reasonable fit between the challenged law and its asserted 
objective.  Bd. of Trs. of State. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 
469, 480-81 (1989).  That burden – and the protection of 
speech that heightened judicial scrutiny is meant to ensure – 
would be meaningless indeed if it did not ask the government, 
at the very least, to justify its choice to prohibit speech where 
substantially less burdensome alternatives are available. 
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Complaint’s allegation that “no specific instances of 
obstructive conduct outside of hospitals or health care 
facilities in the City of Pittsburgh … provide support for the 
law … .”  (App. at 56a.)19  The Plaintiffs further claim that 
“[n]o speech activities on the public sidewalks and ways 
outside the Liberty Avenue Planned Parenthood in recent 
years have caused a problem preventing access to its 
entrances.”  (App. at 57a.)  Again, these assertions must be 
credited at this stage.  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 
224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
 McCullen required the sovereign to justify its 
regulation of political speech by describing the efforts it had 
made to address the government interests at stake by 
substantially less-restrictive methods or by showing that it 
seriously considered and reasonably rejected “different 
methods that other jurisdictions have found effective.”  134 S. 
Ct. at 2539.  Such proof can only be considered, however, 
after a fair opportunity for discovery and the production of 
evidence.  Indeed, when a complaint states a plausible First 
Amendment claim of the type advanced here and 
substantially less burdensome alternatives appear to have 
been available to the city or state, the city or state will rarely 
                                              
 19 One might argue that the qualifying phrase “provide 
support for the law” makes that allegation primarily a legal 
rather than a factual contention.  See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-
11 (holding that a court presented with a motion to dismiss 
“may disregard any legal conclusions” set out in the 
complaint).  Viewing it generously for the Plaintiffs, 
however, we will take it to mean that no meaningful 
obstruction has occurred. 
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be able to satisfy narrow tailoring at the pleading stage.20  At 
this early point in the present case, without such proof, the 
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims cannot be dismissed.  We 
instead must credit the allegations of the Complaint, which 
plausibly state a claim that the City’s Ordinance “burden[s] 
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the 
government’s legitimate interests.”  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 
2535 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 The City contends, consistent with the District Court’s 
opinion, that McCullen did not alter the narrow-tailoring 
analysis to the degree necessary to change the conclusion we 
reached in Brown.  But McCullen employs a level of rigor 
that Brown did not approach.  In fact, Brown engaged in no 
                                              
 20 Although this is not such a case, there may be cases 
in which it is clear – before any evidence is produced 
regarding the government’s history of attempting and 
considering alternatives – that the chosen regulation is 
reasonably narrowly tailored under intermediate scrutiny.  For 
example, were one to challenge the hypothetical de minimis 
sound amplification law posited by the concurrence, that 
regulation would likely be viewed as narrowly tailored, even 
at the pleading stage.  With such a slight burden on speech, 
any challengers would struggle to show that “alternative 
measures [would] burden substantially less speech.”  
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2540 (emphasis added). 
 We also note that our emphasis on the need for the 
development of a factual record arises not only from the 
general principle that a court should have a sufficient basis to 
support its legal conclusions but more particularly from the 
Supreme Court’s instruction in McCullen on the importance 
of a factual record in considering the constitutionality of such 
buffer zone laws. 
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narrow-tailoring analysis of its own.  It instead incorporated 
the analyses of Madsen and Schenck by reference and 
concluded that Pittsburgh’s buffer zone was “a fortiori 
constitutionally valid” in light of those past cases.  Brown, 
586 F.3d at 276.  At the very least, McCullen has called that 
approach into question, clarifying that the particular facts of 
each case must be examined.21  No buffer zone can be upheld 
a fortiori simply because a similar one was deemed 
constitutional, since the background facts associated with the 
creation and enforcement of a zone cannot be assumed to be 
identical with those of an earlier case, even if the ordinances 
in the two cases happened to be the same. 
 
 McCullen made this evident when it struck down a 
smaller buffer zone than that which was upheld in Madsen.  
Also, both Madsen and Schenck involved plaintiff-specific 
injunctions, which is one of the less-restrictive alternatives 
identified by McCullen that a sovereign should utilize before 
turning to “broad, prophylactic measures” like generally-
applicable buffer zones that “unnecessarily sweep[] in 
innocent individuals and their speech.”  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2538.  And it may be noteworthy that Brown considered its 
narrow-tailoring conclusion to be “bolstered” by the First 
Circuit’s opinion in McCullen, which was the very decision 
later reversed by the Supreme Court.  Brown, 586 F.3d at 276. 
 
                                              
 21 In this way, we entirely agree with the concurrence’s 
observation that McCullen requires that courts may no longer 
hold “that a speech regulation is constitutional if it is facially 
similar to a restriction upheld in a prior Supreme Court case.”  
(Concurrence at 5.) 
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McCullen represents an important clarification of the 
rigorous and fact-intensive nature of intermediate scrutiny’s 
narrow-tailoring analysis, and the decision is sufficient to call 
into question our conclusion in Brown.  See In re Krebs, 527 
F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A panel of this Court may 
reevaluate the holding of a prior panel which conflicts with 
intervening Supreme Court precedent.”).  The recent 
instruction from McCullen and the factual allegations of the 
Complaint combine to require that we vacate the District 
Court’s grant of the City’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ 
free speech claims.  Because the Plaintiffs’ Complaint should 
not have been dismissed, the District Court’s improper 
consideration of materials beyond the pleadings to convert the 
motion to one for summary judgment cannot be treated as 
harmless error. 
 
  2. Free Press Claim 
 
 The Plaintiffs also raise a claim under the Freedom of 
the Press Clause of the First Amendment, because “the 
Ordinance prohibits them from leafleting on public 
sidewalks.”  (Opening Br. at 37.)  The District Court did not 
directly address that aspect of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment 
claim, instead dismissing the facial challenge in its entirety.  
On appeal, the City argues that the free press claim “properly 
fell along with the rest of the First Amendment claim under 
the district court’s analysis.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 42 n.4.) 
 
 The City’s contention is correct in the abstract.  Had 
the District Court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs’ free 
speech claim, it would also have been proper to dismiss their 
free press claim, because the Plaintiffs’ free press claim is, in 
this context, properly considered a subset of their broader free 
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speech claim, given that the Freedom of the Press Clause and 
the Free Speech Clause both protect leafleting from 
government interference.  See Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 
303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“The liberty of the press is not 
confined to newspapers and periodicals.  It necessarily 
embraces pamphlets and leaflets.”); McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“[T]he speech 
in which Mrs. McIntyre engaged – handing out leaflets in the 
advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint – is the 
essence of First Amendment expression.”). 
 
 But as the claims could properly fall together, the 
converse is also true here: resuscitation of the broader free 
speech claim requires us to vacate the dismissal of the free 
press claim.  In light of the burden the Ordinance places on 
speech, the City’s inability to show at the motion to dismiss 
stage that substantially less burdensome alternatives would 
fail to achieve its interests dooms its broad prohibition on all 
of the Plaintiffs’ expressive activities, including the 
prohibition on leafleting. 
 
  3. Overbreadth Claim 
 
 The Plaintiffs next contend that the Ordinance violates 
the First Amendment by imposing an unconstitutionally 
overbroad restriction on speech “because it authorizes the 
creation of zones at non-abortion locations where the City 
does not even claim there has been a justification for banning 
speech.”  (Opening Br. at 38.)  The City responds – just as the 
District Court did in dismissing this claim – that their 
argument is “foreclosed by this Court’s decision in Brown.”  
(Answering Br. at 42.)  In Brown, we rejected the plaintiff’s 
facial overbreadth challenge because such a claim was 
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undercut by Hill.  586 F.3d at 282-83 n.21.  Hill involved a 
floating bubble zone that applied, like Pittsburgh’s Ordinance, 
to “any health care facility.”  Hill, 530 U.S. at 707.  Despite 
that, the Supreme Court upheld the statute against a facial 
challenge to its overbreadth.  Id. at 730-32.  “The fact that the 
coverage of a statute is broader than the specific concern that 
led to its enactment is of no constitutional significance,” the 
Court noted.  Id. at 730-31.  In fact, said the Court, “the 
comprehensiveness of the statute is a virtue, not a vice, 
because it is evidence against there being a discriminatory 
governmental motive.”  Id. at 731. 
 
 Like the statute at issue in Hill, a buffer zone under the 
Ordinance can be established at any “hospital, medical office 
or clinic … .”  (App. at 150a.)  But the Plaintiffs’ Complaint 
alleges that the Ordinance “is only enforced outside of health 
care facilities which provide abortions” (App. at 56a); the 
entirety of the discussion of the Ordinance’s enforcement in 
the Complaint relates to a single Planned Parenthood location.   
 
The McCullen Court did address the breadth of the 
Massachusetts buffer zone statute, but it did so only in the 
context of its free speech analysis and discussion of the 
disconnect between the government interests at stake and the 
means through which it sought to vindicate those interests.  
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2539 (noting that interests pertaining 
“mainly to one place at one time: the Boston Planned 
Parenthood clinic on Saturday mornings” do not require 
“creating 35-foot buffer zones at every clinic across the 
Commonwealth”).  Given its holding striking down the law, 
McCullen explicitly did not reach the petitioners’ overbreadth 
challenge.  Id. at 2540 n.9.   
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We think it unwise for us to assess the proper scope of 
the City’s Ordinance without there first being a resolution of 
the merits of the Plaintiffs’ free speech claim.  It is true that 
the breadth of the challenged law plays a role in the narrow-
tailoring analysis of the Plaintiffs’ free speech claim.  See 
Brown, 586 F.3d at 273 n.10 (“What the petitioners classified 
as an ‘overbreadth’ problem, in other words, was better 
understood analytically as a concern to be addressed within 
the framework of … [a] narrow-tailoring test.”); McCullen, 
134 S. Ct. at 2539 (comparing breadth of statute against 
government interest in striking down statute on narrow-
tailoring grounds).  But we cannot adequately assess the 
overbreadth argument absent a well-supported conclusion 
regarding the proper scope of the Ordinance.  “[A] law may 
be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its 
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the 
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Without the developed 
factual record that McCullen requires, we do not know the 
“legitimate sweep” of the buffer zone law, and thus whether it 
substantially exceeds that sweep.  As with the Plaintiffs’ other 
First Amendment claims, it is premature to dismiss their 
overbreadth challenge.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
District Court’s dismissal of the overbreadth claim. 
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  4. Due Process Claim 
 
 Finally, the Plaintiffs maintain that the Ordinance 
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it “vests unbridled discretion in the City 
to create buffer zones outside of any hospital or health care 
facility in the City of Pittsburgh.”  (Opening Br. at 42.)  The 
District Court dismissed that claim because the substance of 
the claim is “more appropriately characterized as violations 
under the First Amendment.”  (App. at 39a.) 
 
 The District Court properly pointed out that all of the 
precedents cited by the Plaintiffs involved First Amendment 
claims.  “Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit 
textual source of constitutional protection against a particular 
sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more 
generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the 
guide for analyzing these claims.”  Albright v. Oliver, 510 
U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Any 
concerns about the exercise of discretion vested in City 
officials can be addressed in an as-applied challenge to the 
Ordinance’s enforcement under the First Amendment.22  We 
thus agree with the District Court that “[t]he First 
Amendment is the proper constitutional home for Plaintiffs’ 
                                              
 22 In granting the parties’ motion to voluntarily dismiss 
with prejudice the as-applied challenges, the District Court’s 
order noted: “The parties specify that dismissal is with 
prejudice to these two existing matters, but the prejudice does 
not prevent assertion of such claims against future 
applications of the ordinance by the City.”  (District Court 
Docket, Doc. 31.) 
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freedom of speech and press claims … .”  (App. at 37a.)  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
the Plaintiffs’ Due Process claim.23 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims 
and affirm the dismissal of their Due Process claim.  Again, 
nothing in this opinion should be construed as a conclusion 
about the ultimate merits of the claims or defenses advanced 
by the parties.  There are not enough facts in the record for us 
to make any such comment, even were we so inclined.  That 
is the problem.  We reverse so that the Plaintiffs’ claims may 
be aired and assessed by the standard that McCullen now 
requires. 
 
                                              
 23 Although the Plaintiffs also raised a procedural due 
process claim, which the District Court dismissed, they have 
made no argument before us concerning that claim.  
Accordingly, any argument supporting the procedural due 
process claim is waived.  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 
F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an 
appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening 
brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”). 
 1 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
I agree with the majority that the allegations in the 
Complaint, taken as true, establish that Pittsburgh’s 
Ordinance restricting certain speech within 15 feet of 
designated health care facilities violates the intermediate-
scrutiny standard for time, place, and manner regulations.  I 
disagree, however, with the majority’s reasoning in support of 
that result.  In particular, I disagree with its conclusion that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in McCullen v. Coakley1 
requires governments that place “significant” burdens on 
speech to prove either that less speech-restrictive measures 
have failed or that alternative measures were “seriously” 
considered and “reasonably” rejected.  That interpretation 
distorts narrow-tailoring doctrine by eliminating the 
government’s latitude to adopt regulations that are not “the 
least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the 
government’s interests.”2  Nothing in McCullen or the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence requires us 
to apply such a rule.  Accordingly, as to Plaintiffs’ free-
speech claim, I concur only in the judgment.3 
 
I. 
 
My disagreement with the majority stems entirely from 
our differing interpretations of McCullen. Unlike the 
majority, I do not believe that McCullen announces a general 
                                              
1 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
2 Id. at 2535 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3 I agree with the majority’s disposition of Plaintiffs’ free 
press, overbreadth, and due process claims. 
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rule requiring the government to affirmatively prove that less-
restrictive measures would fail to achieve its interests.  Before 
addressing the source of this disagreement, therefore, I think 
it is useful to review McCullen and to situate it among the 
Supreme Court’s narrow-tailoring and abortion-protest 
precedents. 
 
 McCullen is, first and foremost, a straightforward 
application of the Ward narrow-tailoring standard for time, 
place, and manner regulations.  Such regulations “must not 
‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further 
the government’s legitimate interests.’”4  But the regulation 
“‘need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ 
serving the government’s interests.”5  The ultimate question is 
whether the government has achieved an appropriate “balance 
between the affected speech and the governmental interests 
that the ordinance purports to serve.”6   
 
McCullen was a case of extreme imbalance—so much 
so that the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the 
challenged statute failed narrow tailoring.  The Massachusetts 
law at issue imposed remarkably onerous burdens on 
speakers, prohibiting all speech by all non-exempt persons in 
a 35-foot section of the public way at all abortion clinics in 
the entire state of Massachusetts.7   As the Supreme Court 
                                              
4 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).   
5 Id. at 2535 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798).   
6 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of 
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165 (2002).   
7 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2526.    
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recognized, “closing a substantial portion of a traditional 
public forum to all speakers” is an “extreme step.”8  
Likewise, “categorically exclud[ing] non-exempt individuals” 
from particular zones was certain to “unnecessarily sweep in 
innocent individuals and their speech.”9  And the risks were 
not simply hypothetical.  Based on the record, the Court 
concluded that the Massachusetts buffer zones “impose[d] 
serious burdens on petitioners’ speech” and “carve[d] out a 
significant portion of the adjacent public sidewalks, pushing 
petitioners well back from the clinics’ entrances and 
driveways.”10   
 
The Massachusetts law also departed significantly 
from the regulations upheld in the Supreme Court’s prior 
abortion-protest cases.  Unlike the injunctions in Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Center, Inc.11 and Schenck v. Pro-Choice 
Network of Western N.Y.,12 which were targeted at specific 
defendants in specific locations, the Massachusetts law 
prohibited speech by all persons at all abortion clinics 
throughout the state.  Unlike the so-called “bubble zones” in 
Hill v. Colorado,13 the Massachusetts law forbade speakers 
from even standing in the buffer zone, thereby foreclosing 
leafletting or consensual conversations within the zone.  And 
                                              
8 Id. at 2541 (emphasis added).   
9 Id. at 2538.   
10 Id. at 2537-38 (emphasis added).   
11 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
12 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
13 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
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it did so by cordoning off an entire portion of the public 
forum to all speakers and all messages. 
 
The fact that the Massachusetts law imposed “truly 
exceptional” burdens on speakers also naturally suggested 
that Massachusetts had “too readily forgone options that 
could serve its interests just as well.”14  The Court proposed a 
number of less-intrusive alternatives: access problems could 
be addressed through a law that prohibited deliberate 
obstruction of clinic entrances; harassment could be 
addressed by an ordinance like the one adopted in New York 
City that makes it a crime “to follow and harass another 
person within 15 feet of the premises of a reproductive health 
care facility”; and targeted injunctions could be used against 
particularly troublesome individuals.15  But because 
Massachusetts could not identify a single prosecution brought 
under the other laws at its disposal, it could not show “that it 
seriously undertook to address the problem with less intrusive 
tools readily available to it.”16  The Court concluded that 
Massachusetts could not enact such an extreme speech 
prohibition without offering a correspondingly 
comprehensive justification. 
 
McCullen, fairly read, represents an incremental 
advance in narrow-tailoring doctrine.  As the majority 
implicitly recognizes, McCullen did not alter the substantive 
standard for time, place, and manner restrictions.  What it did, 
rather, is direct courts toward a more nuanced mode of 
                                              
14 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537.   
15 Id. at 2537-39.   
16 Id. at 2539.   
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narrow-tailoring analysis.  It is no longer enough to say, as we 
did in Brown v. City of Pittsburgh,17 that a speech regulation 
is constitutional if it is facially similar to a restriction upheld 
in a prior Supreme Court case.  Instead, courts must scrutinize 
the practical operation of the regulation at issue, including its 
effects on particular types of messaging (e.g., sidewalk 
counseling and handbilling), the degree to which it privileges 
ease of enforcement rather than legitimate public access 
interests, and, in appropriate cases, the availability of less 
burdensome alternatives.  Such scrutiny is especially 
warranted where, as in McCullen, the government enacts a 
blanket prohibition to address a localized problem. 
 
These are modest, commonsense propositions.  
Notably, not a single Supreme Court justice considered 
McCullen’s narrow-tailoring analysis worthy of dissent or 
separate comment—a remarkable consensus in a case pitting 
abortion-access interests against the right to free speech.  That 
unanimity is not surprising in light of the extreme facts 
presented and the straightforward doctrinal analysis required.  
McCullen, when read against its precedents, is best 
understood as a boundary-setting exercise—a corrective but 
ultimately unexceptional exposition of narrow-tailoring 
doctrine.   
II. 
 
The majority reads McCullen differently.  McCullen, it 
says, announces a new rule: henceforth, the government must 
justify any law that places a “significant” burden on speech 
“by describing the efforts it ha[s] made to address the 
government interests at stake by substantially less-restrictive 
                                              
17 586 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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methods or by showing that it seriously considered and 
reasonably rejected ‘different methods that other jurisdictions 
have found effective.’”18  Applying the rule to this case, the 
majority states that the City “has the same obligation to use 
less restrictive alternatives . . . as the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts had with respect to the buffer zone at issue in 
McCullen.”19  Therefore, regardless of any differences in size 
and prohibited conduct between the Massachusetts buffer 
zones and the City’s buffer zones, the Ordinance is flatly 
unconstitutional unless the City can “show either that 
                                              
18 Maj. Op. 27, 31 (quoting McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2539.)  
As the majority acknowledges, the rule it announces today 
applies only to laws, like the buffer zone in McCullen, that 
place a “significant burden on speech.”  Id. 27.  The rule does 
not apply in the mine run of cases involving ordinary or de 
minimis time, place, and manner restrictions.  Id. 32 n.20. 
An example may illustrate the distinction.  Imagine 
that a beach town adopts a de minimis time, place and manner 
restriction: no person may use an electronic sound-
amplification device on the beach between the hours of 1:00 
a.m. and 6:00 a.m.  Under today’s decision, this law should 
be upheld simply because it hardly burdens any speech, and 
certainly does not burden more speech than necessary to 
achieve the government’s interests.  The town government 
need not prove either that it attempted or that it seriously 
considered and reasonably rejected less restrictive 
alternatives, such as a law saying no amplification devices 
between 2:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., or a law saying no 
amplification devices within 100 feet of a beachfront 
residence, or a law saying no amplifiers above 50 watts. 
19 Maj. Op. 27. 
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substantially less-restrictive alternatives were tried and failed, 
or that the alternatives were closely examined and ruled out 
for good reason.”20  The majority acknowledges that under 
this rule, “dismissal of claims challenging ordinances like the 
one at issue here will rarely, if ever, be appropriate at the 
pleading stage.”21 But “without such proof, the Plaintiffs’ 
First Amendment claims cannot be dismissed.”22 
 
I believe that the majority’s new “proof of prior 
efforts” rule is contrary to McCullen and distorts First 
Amendment doctrine.  It is, of course, indisputably true that 
under McCullen, the government cannot take “the extreme 
step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public 
forum to all speakers” without “seriously addressing the 
problem through alternatives that leave the forum open for its 
time-honored purposes.”23  But that is not the same thing as 
saying that every “significant” time, place, and manner law—
or even every buffer zone—must be supported by evidence 
that the government vetted less-restrictive alternatives prior to 
the law’s adoption, regardless of the burden the law actually 
places on speech.  Such a rule stretches McCullen too far, 
risks untoward results, and disregards McCullen’s express 
statement that a regulation—even one that places 
“significant” burdens on speech—need not be the least 
restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the 
government’s interests.  
 
                                              
20 Maj. Op. 28.     
21 Maj. Op. 4. 
22 Maj. Op. 32. 
23 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2541 (emphasis added).   
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Contrary to the majority’s reading, McCullen’s 
invocation of less-restrictive alternatives did not break new 
ground in First Amendment doctrine.  The burden is always 
on the government to prove that a time, place, or manner 
restriction does not “burden substantially more speech than is 
necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”24  
A necessary part of that inquiry is whether there are less-
restrictive alternatives that could meet the government’s 
interests.25  It is therefore unexceptional to say, as the Court 
did in McCullen, that “the government must demonstrate that 
alternative measures that burden substantially less speech 
would fail to achieve the government’s interests.”26  If the 
government’s needs could be met by alternatives that “burden 
substantially less speech,” then the challenged regulation ipso 
facto “burdens substantially more speech than is necessary.”  
But the adverb supplies the test: the operative question, in this 
case and others, is whether the proposed alternatives would 
burden substantially less speech while still furthering the 
government’s interests.  In practice, this means that a city 
                                              
24 Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.   
25 See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 529 
(1996) (“The availability of less burdensome alternatives to 
reach the stated goal signals that the fit between the 
legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those 
ends may be too imprecise to withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny.” (O’Connor, J. concurring)).   
26 134 S. Ct. at 2540.  It also seems implausible that the 
Supreme Court would choose to announce a new, standalone 
First Amendment tailoring rule in the middle of a paragraph 
at the end of an opinion section devoted to rejecting a party’s 
arguments.   
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faced with a range of possible solutions to a public nuisance 
is free to reject less-burdensome options, so long as it does 
not reject viable options that would burden substantially less 
speech. 
 
The majority opinion grafts an additional requirement 
onto the “substantially more speech than necessary” test: a 
municipality must now also prove that, before adopting a 
regulation that “significantly” burdens speech, it either 
attempted or “seriously considered” and “reasonably 
rejected” less-intrusive alternatives.    This rule improperly 
elevates one element of the narrow-tailoring inquiry—the 
availability of less-burdensome alternatives—into a 
standalone rule of constitutionality.  And it does so by 
converting our inquiry from an after-the-fact assessment of 
the burdens and benefits of a regulation (what McCullen 
actually requires) into a review of the sufficiency of the 
underlying legislative record (something no court has ever 
required).  I see no reason why we should begin conducting 
judicial audits of the legislative rulemaking process.27  As 
                                              
27 Note the fundamental oddity of today’s rule, which 
essentially requires legislatures to “show us their work” and 
prove that they took certain considerations into account 
during the rulemaking process.  We frequently assess speech 
statutes by asking what problem the statute was meant to 
solve and how well it does so in practice.  And as the majority 
notes, we will sometimes review the legislative record when 
deference requires us to assess whether Congress acted 
reasonably, see Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 
195-96 (1997), or when determining whether the 
government’s justification for a regulation is purely 
speculative, see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 
 10 
 
                                                                                                     
41, 50-52 (1986).  But I am unaware of any First Amendment 
context in which we affirmatively require a legislative body 
to produce a record of its underlying decisionmaking 
processes, and then base our constitutional determination on 
whether the legislature crossed off each item on a prescribed 
factfinding checklist before it enacted the rule in question.  
Intermediate scrutiny requires us to defer to a legislature’s 
judgments, not dictate its rulemaking procedures.  See Turner 
Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 218 (“It is well established a 
regulation’s validity does not turn on a judge’s agreement 
with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most 
appropriate method for promoting significant government 
interests.”) (internal quotation omitted); City of Renton, 475 
U.S. at 50-52 (cities enacting time, place, and manner 
regulations need not produce evidence specifically relating to 
the city’s problems or needs and may instead rely on the 
experiences of other cities). 
The novelty of this type of constitutional review raises 
a variety of practical questions, none of which are answered 
in the majority opinion.  For starters:  How can a government 
ever determine, prior to legislating, which alternatives it must 
“seriously consider”?  What constitutes a “reasoned” 
rejection?  When a government legislates to address a new 
problem (i.e., in the absence of practical enforcement 
experience), what weight should courts give to predictive 
judgments about the drawbacks or benefits of a rejected 
proposal?  How, if at all, does the “seriously 
considered/reasonably rejected” standard incorporate the 
Supreme Court’s instruction in Hill, 530 U.S. at 727, that we 
must “accord a measure of deference” to the legislature’s 
judgment regarding how best to accommodate competing 
interests?  Can a government “reasonably reject” a viable 
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McCullen makes clear, the constitutionality of a speech 
regulation depends on its scope and its effects, not on whether 
whether the legislative body satisfied some indeterminate set 
of preconditions before it began drafting.   The Supreme 
Court’s time, place, and manner jurisprudence is concerned 
with outcomes rather than procedure. 
 
By extending judicial scrutiny to the legislative 
process itself, the majority’s new tailoring standard 
improperly eliminates much of the discretion that Ward and 
McCullen confer on municipal decisionmakers.28  Ward tells 
municipalities that they need not entertain every conceivable 
less-intrusive alternative before adopting a speech law, 
because hypothetical regulations that would not burden 
substantially less speech than the chosen option are irrelevant 
                                                                                                     
alternative that would burden substantially less speech than 
the chosen option?   
The majority leaves these questions to future courts.  
In light of the novelty of the required inquiry and the fact that 
most (if not all) municipal time, place, and manner 
restrictions are not supported by the type of factual record 
today’s decision requires, it is worth reemphasizing that the 
majority’s rule only applies to laws that place significant 
burdens on speech.  In the vast majority of cases, litigants and 
District Courts need not consult legislative history or grapple 
with the questions raised here.   
28 See also Hill, 530 U.S. at 727 (courts evaluating whether a 
speech restriction “is the best possible accommodation of the 
competing interests at stake” must “accord a measure of 
deference” to the legislature’s judgment).   
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to the First Amendment calculus.29  Today’s opinion, by 
contrast, tells municipalities not only that they must entertain 
such alternatives, but that they must also prepare a record 
demonstrating that they “seriously considered” and 
“reasonably rejected” such alternatives during the rulemaking 
process.  Similarly, Ward directs courts not to “sift[ ] through 
all the available or imagined alternative means of regulating” 
a given activity to “determine whether the city’s solution was 
‘the least intrusive means’ of achieving the desired end.”30  
Today’s decision requires courts to sift through the available 
or imagined alternatives to a challenged regulation and 
determine whether the city “reasonably rejected” each one.  
This approach would be understandable if McCullen had 
disavowed or limited Ward.  But McCullen expressly follows 
Ward and preserves government discretion by reaffirming 
that a time, place, and manner regulation “‘need not be the 
least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving the 
government’s interests.”31  Here, a rule that strikes down 
speech laws whenever the government cannot justify the non-
adoption of less-restrictive alternatives treads impermissibly 
close to a rule requiring governments to adopt the least 
restrictive alternative. 
 
                                              
29 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 797 (“[R]estrictions on the time, 
place, or manner of protected speech are not invalid ‘simply 
because there is some imaginable alternative that might be 
less burdensome on speech.’”) (quoting United States v. 
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). 
30 Ward, 491 U.S. at 797. 
31 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 
798).   
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Today’s opinion also introduces a fundamental 
inconsistency into our narrow-tailoring doctrine.  McCullen 
and its predecessors establish that any time, place and manner 
regulation is constitutional so long as it does not burden 
substantially more speech than necessary to achieve the 
government’s aims.  The majority’s new rule bypasses this 
inquiry in cases of “significant” burden and instead mandates 
a finding of unconstitutionality whenever the government 
cannot prove that it tried, properly considered, or reasonably 
rejected less-restrictive alternatives.  This means that even if a 
regulation objectively does not burden substantially more 
speech than necessary, it will still be unconstitutional if the 
government cannot prove that it engaged in the prescribed 
factfinding.  But this is not how narrow tailoring works.  
Under McCullen and its predecessors, a regulation can be 
perfectly constitutional even if the government has no record 
of how it arrived at its rulemaking, so long as the regulation 
does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to 
serve a legitimate government interest.32  The lack of such a 
record may be relevant to the narrow-tailoring analysis, for all 
the reasons explained in McCullen—but it is not dispositive.   
 
This case illustrates my concern.  The majority holds 
that the plaintiffs have successfully pleaded a constitutional 
violation because (1) the City has available to it less-
restrictive alternatives such as “anti-obstruction ordinances, 
criminal enforcement, and targeted injunctions,” and (2) the 
City has failed to try such measures or to justify its decision 
                                              
32 The inverse also holds true: if a law burdens substantially 
more speech than necessary to achieve the government’s 
interests, it should be declared unconstitutional regardless of 
the government’s proffered justification.   
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not to adopt them.33  But this approach fails to address the 
central constitutional question: assuming that the proposed 
alternatives would burden less speech than a 15-foot buffer 
zone, would they burden substantially less speech?34  Or do 
they fall within the range of slightly less burdensome 
restrictions that the City remains free to reject out of hand 
because it is not obligated to choose the least restrictive 
alternative?  To answer, we would need to assess the actual 
burden imposed by the Ordinance; how much less 
burdensome the proposed alternatives would be; and how 
likely it is that the proposed alternatives would meet the 
City’s legitimate interests.  The majority’s per se proof rule 
skips over this analysis and proceeds straight to the outcome.  
 
To the extent the majority reads McCullen as adopting 
a special rule for buffer zones, that distinction does not appear 
on the face of the McCullen opinion or follow naturally from 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning.  As the majority recognizes 
elsewhere, what McCullen actually demands is a nuanced 
tailoring analysis that accounts for context and practical 
consequences—not a rigid new tier of scrutiny for statutes 
that create physical zones of exclusion.  After all, every time 
the government builds a fountain in a public park or installs a 
planter on the sidewalk, it is technically “carving out” a piece 
                                              
33 Maj. Op. 28. 
34 As explained in Section III, infra, the Pittsburgh buffer 
zone at issue here burdens far less speech than the 
Massachusetts zone in McCullen.  Therefore, we cannot 
simply assume that the alternative measures discussed in the 
McCullen opinion would also burden substantially less speech 
than the Pittsburgh Ordinance. 
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of the public forum and preventing its use as a site for 
expression.  We may safely assume that the Supreme Court 
did not intend such projects to be unconstitutional unless a 
city can prove that smaller fountains and planters cannot meet 
the city’s beautification needs.  But I am also confident that 
the McCullen Court did not intend to require courts to 
develop a special body of jurisprudence to deal with such 
questions.   
 
 In short, nothing in McCullen or its antecedents 
requires courts to strike down a time, place, and manner 
restriction whenever the government cannot prove that it tried 
or seriously considered less intrusive measures.  Narrow 
tailoring permits a fit between the legislature’s goal and 
method “that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that 
represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one 
whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”35  
Plaintiffs will always be able to conceive and plead less 
burdensome alternatives to a given regulation.  Forcing the 
government to identify those alternatives and affirmatively 
disprove their viability prior to legislating would convert 
narrow tailoring from a “reasonable fit” requirement to a 
“perfect fit” requirement.  The availability of less-
burdensome alternatives is relevant only to the extent it 
informs the ultimate question: whether the regulation 
“‘burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to 
further the government’s legitimate interests.’”36  That 
                                              
35 Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 
(1989). 
36 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).   
 16 
 
standard, rather than the majority’s inflexible “proof of prior 
efforts” rule, should govern the outcome of this case. 
 
III. 
 
Plaintiffs’ invocation of less-intrusive alternatives 
therefore does not resolve this case.  We still must ask: under 
the fact-specific tailoring analysis required by McCullen, does 
the Pittsburgh Ordinance burden substantially more speech 
than is necessary to further the City’s legitimate interests in 
protecting women’s access to pregnancy-related services, 
ensuring public safety, and promoting the free flow of traffic?  
The majority says “yes,” in part because it views the burdens 
imposed by the Ordinance as functionally indistinguishable 
from the burdens imposed by the Massachusetts law in 
McCullen.  I am less certain.  While I ultimately agree that 
the Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a First Amendment 
violation, there are numerous distinctions between the buffer 
zones in McCullen and the buffer zones in this case.  These 
distinctions demonstrate why this case cannot be decided 
simply by citing the prospect of less-burdensome alternatives. 
 
Size of the Zones.  The most obvious difference 
between the Pittsburgh buffer zones and the McCullen buffer 
zones is their size.  The radius of the Pittsburgh buffer is less 
than half the radius of the Massachusetts buffer, and creates a 
zone whose total area is less than one-fifth the area of the 
Massachusetts zone.  (Put differently, the Massachusetts zone 
was 2.3 times longer, and its total area was 5.4 times larger.)  
The Pittsburgh Ordinance therefore carves out a substantially 
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smaller piece of the public forum.37  I agree with the majority 
that size alone is not dispositive, and that what ultimately 
matters is “the burden on speech that such zones impose.”38  
But when the regulation in question enforces physical 
distances between speakers and listeners, the distance is the 
burden.  And there is reason to think that the difference in 
size between the Massachusetts and Pittsburgh zones is 
constitutionally significant. 
 
The first point to bear in mind is that the buffer zone 
perimeter is not an impermeable barrier that prevents the 
transmission of Plaintiffs’ message to individuals within the 
zone.  Plaintiffs can speak to women who are inside the zone 
or hand leaflets to them if they are within arm’s reach.  
Plaintiffs can begin a conversation with a woman outside the 
zone and continue it as the woman enters the zone, or can 
initiate a conversation with a woman while she is in the zone 
and continue it as she exits.   
 
The second, closely related point is that, because the 
zone is situated around a point of ingress and egress, potential 
listeners will be moving through the zone rather than standing 
in a fixed location beyond earshot.  And the 15-foot buffer 
does not require Plaintiffs to remain 15 feet away from 
patients—just 15 feet away from the clinic doors.  Practically 
                                              
37 Cf. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (the Massachusetts zones 
“carve out a significant portion of the adjacent public 
sidewalks); id. at 2541 (Massachusetts has taken “the extreme 
step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public 
forum to all speakers”).   
38 Maj. Op. 26. 
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speaking, then, a woman entering the clinic will at first be 
quite close to the speaker and then only gradually move 15 
feet away, while a woman exiting the clinic will begin 15 feet 
away but then move into close proximity.   
 
Therefore, a buffer zone around clinic entrances does 
not really exclude speech throughout a physical zone, but 
rather creates a temporal window during which listeners are 
unable or less likely to receive the speaker’s message.  The 
length of that window defines the actual speech burden 
imposed by the buffer regulation.  Here, the window seems 
short.  With respect to oral communication, the Supreme 
Court in Hill concluded that a rule prohibiting speakers from 
entering within eight feet of a listener still “allows the speaker 
to communicate at a normal conversational distance.”39  
Accepting this premise, the Ordinance creates two relevant 
zones: an eight-foot zone in which listeners can 
presumptively be reached through Plaintiffs’ particular brand 
of conversational messaging, and a seven-foot zone in which 
listeners cannot be reached (or only reached with difficulty).  
Women entering or leaving a clinic will likely traverse this 
seven-foot “no-speech” zone in three or four steps—a matter 
of seconds.  The deprivation of those few seconds of 
messaging seems like a minimal burden on Plaintiffs’ speech. 
 
It also seems like a much lesser burden than the one 
imposed by the Massachusetts buffer zone, which created a 
27-foot “no-speech” zone in which women presumably could 
not be reached.  And while it may be debatable whether 
Plaintiffs would truly be unable to communicate with a 
woman in the inner seven-foot zone around Pittsburgh clinics, 
                                              
39 Hill, 530 U.S. at 726-27.   
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it is much more likely that they would have been completely 
unable to communicate with a woman who was well within 
the 27-foot zone in McCullen.  By the same token, if women 
traversing the Pittsburgh buffer zone largely remain within 
earshot of Plaintiffs’ message, that would also alleviate the 
concern raised in McCullen that “[i]f all that the women can 
see and hear are vociferous opponents of abortion, then the 
buffer zones have effectively stifled [sidewalk counselors’] 
message.”40   
 
Plaintiffs, following the Supreme Court’s lead in 
McCullen, also allege that the Ordinance makes it more 
difficult for them to distinguish patients from passersby and 
initiate conversations before they enter the buffer zone.  I 
have not found support for the implicit premise that speakers 
have a First Amendment right to identify preferred listeners.  
Either way, here again there is a qualitative distinction 
between a 35-foot buffer and a 15-foot buffer.  A patient 
heading toward a clinic will almost certainly have manifested 
her intention to enter the clinic by the time she is 15 feet from 
its entrance, but is less likely to have done so at 35 feet out.  
A patient would have to be lost or particularly furtive to avoid 
being noticed by counselors standing 15 feet from the clinic 
doors.  Thus, assuming that Plaintiffs’ ability to recognize 
patients is a valid First Amendment consideration, I doubt 
that the Ordinance seriously hampers that ability. 
 
The Ordinance does, however, place a greater burden 
on leafleting.  Unlike the statute in Hill, the Ordinance does 
not allow speakers to stand within the zone and hand out 
literature to passing women, but rather forces them to do so 
                                              
40 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537. 
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from outside the zone.  But as we noted in Brown, “[a]lthough 
the buffer zone, standing alone, would require leafletters to 
remain beyond arm’s reach of a medical facilities’ entrances, 
they would still be able to approach individuals outside of the 
15-foot radius in order to distribute their literature.”41  In Hill, 
the Supreme Court “noted approvingly that the bubble zone 
allowed leafletters to stand stationary in the path of oncoming 
pedestrians,” which is also the case for Plaintiffs 15 feet away 
from the clinic entrance.42  And because the smaller 15-foot 
zone gives Plaintiffs more time to identify potential patients, 
it affords greater opportunity to physically intercept listeners 
and offer literature. 
 
Scope of Prohibited Activity.  The Massachusetts law 
made it unlawful for anyone to “knowingly enter or remain” 
within a buffer zone.  The Pittsburgh Ordinance makes it 
unlawful to “knowingly congregate, patrol, picket or 
demonstrate” within a buffer zone.  There are at least two 
consequential distinctions between these prohibitions. 
 
First, as the McCullen Court disapprovingly observed, 
the Massachusetts law prohibited all speech of any kind 
within the zone, from political advocacy all the way down to 
cell phone conversations or casual discussions about the 
weather.  The Pittsburgh Ordinance, by contrast, restricts only 
certain kinds of protest speech—“picketing” and 
                                              
41 Brown, 586 F.3d. at 281.   
42 Id. at 278 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 727-28).   
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“demonstrating.”43  To be sure, such speech is core First 
Amendment speech.  But it is nonetheless true that the 
Ordinance’s prohibitions sweep far less widely than the 
Massachusetts law, and do not prohibit innocent or casual 
speech within the zone. 
 
Second, the Ordinance, unlike the Massachusetts law, 
permits protesters and counselors to move through the buffer 
zone.  This understanding has been confirmed by the City in a 
limiting interpretation.44  The City explains in its brief that 
before the December 2014 preliminary injunction hearing, 
“Ms. Bruni and the other plaintiffs apparently believed the 
Ordinance prohibited them from passing through the zone at 
all even if they refrained from prohibited conduct while in the 
zone—for example, if they were standing on one side of the 
clinic’s doorway and wanted to engage someone approaching 
from the other side.  However, that erroneous understanding 
has been clarified . . . .”45  To the extent this limitation gives 
Plaintiffs greater opportunity to physically intercept patients 
before they enter the zone or on their way out, it bears 
                                              
43 The majority is therefore incorrect to characterize the 
Ordinance as a “blanket prohibition on Plaintiffs’ speech in a 
historically-public forum.”  Maj. Op. 30. 
44 See Brown, 586 F.3d at 274 (“When considering a facial 
challenge to a state law, ‘a federal court must, of course, 
consider any limiting construction that a state court or 
enforcement agency has proffered.’” (quoting Vill. of 
Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 
U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982))).   
45 City Br. 18.   
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directly on whether the Ordinance burdens sidewalk 
counseling “substantially” more than necessary. 
 
Statutory Reach.   A key failing of the Massachusetts 
law was its overbreadth: while the record showed that 
congestion was only a problem at one Boston clinic on 
Saturday mornings, the law created permanent buffer zones at 
every single clinic throughout the state.  “For a problem 
shown to arise only once a week in one city at one clinic, 
creating 35-foot buffer zones at every clinic across the 
Commonwealth is hardly a narrowly tailored solution.”46  The 
Pittsburgh Ordinance, by contrast, only applies to clinics 
within one city.  Moreover, following the District Court’s 
post-remand injunction, the City must clearly demarcate any 
buffer zone prior to its enforcement.47  The Complaint only 
identifies one such demarcated buffer zone, outside the 
downtown Planned Parenthood Clinic.48  And because the 
Ordinance only prohibits certain types of protest speech, it 
does not ban speech throughout the week like the 
Massachusetts law, but only at times when protest activity 
actually occurs.  In contrast to the Massachusetts law, the 
Pittsburgh Ordinance appears tailored to address a particular 
problem in a particular location at particular times.  
 
* * * 
Accordingly, there are strong practical and doctrinal 
reasons to conclude that the City’s buffer zones are 
qualitatively different from—and burden significantly less 
                                              
46 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2539.   
47 App. 150a. 
48 App. 57a. 
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speech than—the Massachusetts buffer zones in McCullen.  
There is correspondingly less reason to conclude that the 
mere possibility of less-intrusive alternatives requires a 
finding that the Ordinance burdens substantially more speech 
than necessary. 
 
I agree with the majority, however, that it is not the 
Court’s role on a 12(b)(6) motion to supplant the well-
pleaded allegations with its own speculation, or to question 
the Plaintiffs’ characterization of their experiences.  The 
Ordinance may function in the ways I have described above; 
it may not.  What Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint, however, 
is that the Ordinance “prohibits Plaintiffs and others from 
effectively reaching their intended audience”; that the 
Pittsburgh zones “make it more difficult [for the] Plaintiffs to 
engage in sidewalk counseling, prayer, advocacy, and other 
expressive activities”; and that the Ordinance “will cause 
conversations between the Plaintiffs and those entering or 
exiting the facilities to be far less frequent and far less 
successful.”49  These are plausible consequences of the buffer 
zone’s restrictions on sidewalk counseling activity, which, 
according to Plaintiffs, can only be undertaken “through 
close, caring, and personal conversations, and cannot be 
conveyed through protests.”50  And while Plaintiffs may be 
able to speak with women in the zone, there is no dispute that 
the Ordinance categorically prohibits leafleting within a fixed 
portion of a public forum.51   
                                              
49 App. 56a, 60a. 
50 App. 61a. 
51 The ability to leaflet was a key feature of the Colorado 
statute upheld in Hill and a crucial failing of the 
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The Complaint also includes allegations suggesting 
that the Ordinance sweeps more broadly than necessary to 
meet the City’s interests.  As in McCullen, the City’s use of a 
fixed buffer zone plausibly suggests that the City adopted the 
Ordinance because it would be easy to enforce, rather than 
because less intrusive measures could not serve its legitimate 
interests.  Plaintiffs also claim that different laws targeted 
only at harassing or obstructive behavior, such as the ones 
discussed in McCullen, would burden less speech than the 
fixed buffer zones imposed by the Ordinance.  And crucially, 
Plaintiffs allege that “no specific instances of obstructive 
conduct outside of hospitals or health care facilities in the 
City of Pittsburgh . . . provide support for the law.”52 
                                                                                                     
Massachusetts law struck down in McCullen.  As Hill 
acknowledged and McCullen emphasized, “handing out 
leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial 
viewpoint is the essence of First Amendment expression; no 
form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection.”  
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2536.  A sidewalk counselor who 
stands in place offering leaflets for a patient to accept or 
reject does not seem like a serious impediment to patient 
access or public safety.  That said, the Ordinance could 
conceivably be construed to permit leafleting in the buffer 
zone while still prohibiting counseling and other forms of 
importunate speech.  The Ordinance only prohibits 
“congregating,” “patrolling,” “picketing,” and 
“demonstrating” within the zone.  Silent leafleting does not fit 
cleanly into “picketing” or “demonstrating,” and clearly is not 
covered by “congregating” or “patrolling.”  The Ordinance 
may be susceptible to a limiting construction in this regard. 
52 App. 56a. 
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McCullen instructs us to be sensitive to context and to 
the practical effects of the Ordinance on Plaintiffs’ particular 
messaging strategy.  The allegations in the Complaint, taken 
as true, plausibly establish that the Ordinance burdens 
substantially more speech than is necessary to achieve the 
City’s legitimate interests.  It is up to a factfinder to 
determine whether the Ordinance in fact burdens 
“substantially” more speech than necessary (or, conversely, 
whether alternative measures would burden “substantially” 
less speech while still meeting the City’s interests).  I disagree 
with the majority’s conclusion that the availability of 
unexamined, less-restrictive alternatives is sufficient, standing 
alone, to establish a constitutional violation.  But I cannot 
conclude, on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint, 
that the Pittsburgh buffer zones operate so differently from 
the Massachusetts zones that Plaintiffs cannot advance past 
the pleading stage.  
 
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment denying the 
City’s motion to dismiss the free speech claim.   
